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Economic regulatory reforms in Switzerland: adjustment without
European integration or how rigidities become flexible
Abstract
During the 1990s, despite not being a member of the EU and despite the existence of numerous
veto-points, Switzerland displayed an unexpectedly high degree of adjustment to inter- and
supranational regulations, particularly in the field of economic regulatory reforms. The article explains
this high capacity of adjustment by focusing on three major cases: the reform of competition policy, the
liberalization of the telecom sector and the reforms of the public procurement policy. By examining the
interactions between changes at the international level, the induced changing power relations and actor
strategies at the domestic level, as well as national institutional constraints, we provide an empirical
analysis of these reform processes. The article shows that domestic adjustment followed to a large extent
similar patterns in all cases: the government and some administrative actors played an exceptionally
strong leading role in formulating the content of the reforms and in shaping the policy processes.
Further, we identify unusually exclusive decision- making processes, in which the opponents to the
reforms were marginalized. Nevertheless, some strategic concessions were thereafter made to the
"losers' of the reforms, in order to overcome the veto-point of the optional referendum which might have
threatened their success. Keywords: Adjustment Capacity; Europeanization; Policy Process; Regulatory
Reform; Switzerland; Veto-points
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During the 1990s, Switzerland, despite not being a member of the EU and despite the 
existence of numerous veto points, displayed an unexpectedly high degree of adjustment to 
inter- and supranational regulations, particularly in the field of economic regulatory reforms. 
The article explains this high capacity of adjustment, focussing on three major reform cases: 
the reform of competition policy, the liberalisation of the telecom sector and the reforms of 
the public procurement policy. 
Focussing on the interactions between changes at the international level, the induced changing 
power relations and actor strategies at the domestic level, as well as national institutional 
constraints, we provide an empirical analysis of these reform processes. The article shows that 
domestic adjustment followed to a large extent similar patterns in all cases: the government 
and some administrative actors played an uncommonly strong leading role in formulating the 
content of the reforms and in shaping the reform processes. Further, we identify unusually 
exclusive decision-making processes, in which the opponents to the reforms were 
marginalised. Nevertheless, some strategic concessions were thereafter conceded to the 
“losers” of the reforms, in order to overcome the veto point of the facultative referendum 
which might have threatened their success. 
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In many respects, the 1990s can be seen as a turning point for economic policies in 
Switzerland. They stand in sharp contrast to previous decades, which were characterised by 
slow, incremental, and generally limited policy changes. During the 1990s, substantial 
reforms took place in various fields. Three factors were crucial for this shift: First, the 
recession and the sharp increase of unemployment; second, the issues brought about by the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT and by closer ties with the EU, which, despite Switzerland’s 
failed attempt to join the European Economic Area (EEA), stimulated major political debates 
and reforms; and third, pressures from the most internationalised sections of the business 
community for a change in the orientation of social and economic policies. 
Among these changes, economic regulatory reforms took a central place. These reforms 
originated in the debates on the EEA Treaty, negotiated by the EU and the EFTA countries. 
The Treaty implied the adoption of 60% of EU regulations by the EFTA countries. After three 
years of negotiations and an intense political debate in Switzerland, the Swiss citizens finally 
rejected the Treaty in December 1992 in a compulsory popular referendum. After the 
rejection of the EEA Treaty, the government launched an “economic revitalisation program” 
that was supposed to liberalise and deregulate the Swiss economy in order to improve its 
competitiveness. Inspired by economic studies, by the EU-legislation that Switzerland would 
have taken over in case of EEA-membership, and established under the pressure of 
representatives of the most internationalised economic sectors, the program was focussed on 
enhancing competition on the Swiss domestic market. 
At the centre of this program, economic regulatory reforms demonstrate a reinforcement of 
public regulatory authorities through the adoption of new laws awarding more power to 
independent agencies and promoting market logic instead of arbitrary discretion by state 
actors or of protectionist arrangements among private actors. The central aim of our article is 
to analyse the adjustment process of Swiss economic regulations to the evolution of the 
international environment. We will focus our analysis on three case studies of major 
economic regulatory reform: the reform of the Cartel Law (1995), the liberalisation of the 
telecom sector (1991 and 1997) and the reforms of the public procurement policy (1994 and 
1995)1. 
Economic regulatory reforms in Switzerland are of particular interest for two major reasons. 
First, Switzerland is not member of the EU and thus is not formally subjected to EU 
regulations, unlike cases usually studied in the literature. Second, the Swiss political system is 
generally presented as particularly hostile to changes. A high number of veto points, where 
policy proposals can be overturned or watered-down by political opponents, prohibit rapid 
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and wide-ranging policy changes: it suffices to mention the existence of a bicameral 
legislature with strictly identical competencies for both Chambers or the possibility to oppose 
reforms by calling an optional referendum. These institutional veto points usually lead to 
negotiations including not only political parties, but also interest groups and the cantons as 
early as in the highly institutionalised so-called “pre-parliamentary phase” of the policy 
process. It is thus no surprise that reforms are – when effective at all – usually incremental 
(Kriesi 1995 and Papadopoulos 1997). For these two reasons, reforms and adaptation to 
international changes would be expected to be particularly weak in Switzerland. However, 
despite non-membership in the EU and its unfavourable institutional context, Switzerland 
largely adjusted its economic regulatory framework to the new international environment, in 
particular to EU rules. How was that possible? This is the driving question of this article, 
which is less focused on the content of the new regulations (see however below for an 
overview) than on the way the policy-making process was reshaped in order to enhance the 
chances for reform. 
Our paper is structured as follows. In a first part, we present the analytical framework used to 
understand domestic adjustment processes in response to external changes. In a second part, 
we provide a brief overview on the content of the three regulatory reforms under scrutiny. In 
the third part, we highlight how changes at the international level in the three policy domains 
affected the domestic political arena and favoured pro-liberalisation actors, as well as the 
emergence of new “norm entrepreneurs” who played a crucial role in the reforms. In the last 
part, we show how the rapid adjustment to changes at the international level was possible in 
spite of the high number of veto points in the Swiss decision-making structure. 
1. External changes and domestic veto points 
To understand the dynamic of regulatory changes in Switzerland, the literature on 
Europeanisation has proven to be particularly helpful, despite the fact that Switzerland is not a 
member of the EU. In a synthetic article, Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) distinguish three 
mechanisms of Europeanisation: institutional compliance, changing domestic opportunity 
structures and framing domestic beliefs and expectations (see also Héritier and al. 2001 and 
Green-Cowles and al. 2001). The first mechanism mainly refers to EU policies of “positive 
integration”, such as environmental or consumer protection and aspects of social policy, while 
the second mechanism largely applies to market-making policies, concerning mainly the 
abolition of national obstacles to the functioning of the common market. Finally, the third 
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mechanism can be observed in different EU policies. While the first mechanism is certainly 
less relevant for Switzerland, the two others mechanisms apply quite well for Swiss 
regulatory policies. This perspective is very similar to the general analytical framework 
provided by Börzel and Risse (2002), who also distinguish two pathways leading to domestic 
reforms. First, changes in the international environment foster a “redistribution of resources” 
at the domestic level affecting the power relations among political actors. Second, following a 
more sociological institutionalist approach, the authors stress the importance of “learning 
processes” among political and economic elites and the emergence of new “norm 
entrepreneurs”, who are expected to promote domestic reforms. Furthermore, adaptational 
pressures emerge only if there is a certain degree of “misfit” between EU rules and national 
ones. For the Swiss case, this precondition was clearly fulfilled since domestic economic 
regulation showed a high degree of misfit with international and European rules. 
In all cases we studied, the dynamics of reform were the result of the interactions between 
international transformations and domestic impulses. The external changes offered a window 
of opportunity for certain domestic actors (mainly the government and parts of the federal 
administration, sustained by pro-liberalisation actors) for the achievement of reforms. 
Scholars diverge however on the role of “power redistribution” or of “learning processes” in 
policy change, depending on their affinities with respectively rational choice and sociological 
versions of institutionalism. We argue that in Switzerland it is their combination that opened 
avenues for reform. We can thus identify, on the one hand, the strengthening of economic and 
political actors whose preferences were in line with the international evolution, and on the 
other hand the emergence of new “norm entrepreneurs” who were able to spread the idea of a 
need for adaptation to the new models of economic regulation. These dynamics led to the 
formation of new pro-liberalisation coalitions, including economic, political and 
administrative actors as well as economic and legal experts, in the three policy domains. With 
the support of these actors, the government was able to impose a partial redesign of decision-
making procedures and thus to circumvent the veto points of the traditional Swiss decision-
making process that are usually conducive to inertia or incremental change. We wish to insist 
on this aspect because the literature on policy changes tends to consider veto points primarily 
as rigid institutions and not as objects on which reformers can have some influence (in other 
words only as independent variables). 
A re-discussion of this view is, however, needed. The distinction between collective and 
competitive veto points made by Crepaz and Birchfield (2000) helps to better understand why 
veto points can be more flexible than usually asserted. Competitive veto points operate 
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through the interplay between separate and differently composed institutional bodies: the 
decision of each body can be challenged by the other one (e.g. bicameralism or popular 
referendum). Collective veto points refer to negotiations among political actors that take place 
on a face-to-face basis. They are bargaining arenas where actors deliberate in order to reach 
compromises that can be endorsed by most of them (typically corporatist structures or multi-
party coalitions). In Switzerland, collective veto points were introduced at the beginning of 
the policy process in order to prevent policy failure in one of the subsequent competitive veto 
points (bicameralism or the optional referendum). Collective veto points are, however, less 
institutionalised than competitive veto points: e.g. there are no clear rules for the composition 
of an experts committee, whereas the role of the bicameral legislature or of direct democracy 
is codified in the Constitution. Hence the former are less rigid and more subject to strategic 
manipulation than the latter. If agreements on the orientation of reforms are difficult to find in 
encompassing negotiations, adequate shaping of cooperative procedures can provide “escape 
routes” (Héritier 2000) to deadlock in policy-making. Of course such a reengineering entails a 
number of risks regarding the subsequent acceptance of reforms by actors left aside and able 
to exert their power in competitive veto points. In order to avoid that risk, another step is 
required through the granting of concessions to the opponents on the substance of the reform. 
The combination of these devices should not be viewed as a premeditated strategy on behalf 
of reformers, but rather as the result of the successive interactions that take place in “nested 
games” played throughout the policy process. 
2. Economic regulatory reforms in the 1990s: an overview 
The major axis of the revitalisation program launched by the government in 1993 concerned 
the liberalisation of domestic markets. The changing nature of state interventionism and 
public regulations concerned especially two dimensions. First, similarly to EU member states, 
the monopoly situation and the traditional state ownership of the major utilities (Post, 
Telecommunications, Railways, Electricity) have been called into question since the 
beginning of the 1990s. Second, and this dimension is more specific to Switzerland, the Swiss 
economy was characterised by its dualism between highly competitive export-oriented sectors 
and much more sheltered sectors producing for the domestic market, and by the central role of 
private actors as self-regulators of various economic sectors2. Thus, a general liberal trade 
policy was combined with various forms of selective protectionism organised by private 
actors or through specific public regulations. During the 1990s, in the perspective of closer 
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ties with the EU, the representatives of the most internationalised Swiss companies, who did 
not tolerate anymore the costs of these measures favouring mostly the domestic sectors of the 
economy, have increasingly called into question these policies of selective protectionism. 
All three case studies are particularly illustrative of the transformation of state 
interventionism, through the establishment of new regulatory frameworks designed to 
promote competition. Competition policy, implemented by the newly created Competition 
commission (ComCo), is the most transversal instrument designed to combat anti-competitive 
practices. In the two other sectoral cases, new regulations were issued and new regulatory 
agencies were endowed with wider competencies: the Commission on Communication 
(ComCom) and the Federal Office for Communications (OFCOM) in the telecom sector; the 
Federal Recourse Commission and the independent commission supervising compliance with 
international obligations in the domain of public procurement. 
Let us now briefly sketch the major changes introduced in the three policy domains. The 
reform of the Cartel Law, clearly inspired by EU regulations, was one of the major 
components of the economic program of the government. Although the new law does not 
forbid cartels, which would have required a constitutional amendment, it gives decisional 
competencies to the new ComCo and provides a much clearer and severe appreciation of 
cartels, abuse of dominant position and of mergers. This reform was labelled by some 
competition law specialists as a “paradigm shift” of Swiss competition law. The reform can be 
considered as a turning point concerning domestic markets regulation and stands in sharp 
contrast to the prevalent tradition of tolerance and laxity towards cartels. 
In the telecom sector too, major changes occurred during the last decade: thorough 
liberalisation of the market, a change in the statute of the national public company with its 
partial privatisation, and a new regulatory framework. The liberalisation followed a parallel 
rhythm to the changes in the EU and proceeded in two steps: a first reform of the 
Telecommunications Law in 1991 and a second one in 1997. 
The major elements of the 1991 reform can be summarised as follows: 1) liberalisation of the 
“value added network services” and of the terminal equipment, combined with the 
maintenance of public monopoly of the PTT on basic services; 2) splitting of the activities of 
market regulation and services provision, through the creation of the OFCOM, competent for 
the definition of technical norms and for granting concessions to private actors. The law was 
reformed again in 1997 to comply with the EU agenda of the total liberalisation of the 
telecom sector. The 1997 reform concerned two dimensions. First, a new law on the statute of 
the telecom company provided for a separation of the post and telecom services into two 
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distinct companies. The second dimension concerned the complete liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector through the removal of the public monopoly and the creation of 
the independent ComCom, which would guarantee free access on the telecom market in 
collaboration with the OFCOM. 
As to public procurement regulations, Swiss public markets were very weakly regulated until 
the beginning of the 1990s and public procurement was widely used as an instrument for 
regional and structural economic policy. Thus, markets were characterised by protectionist 
arrangements and prices largely above the average of other European countries. In Spring 
1994, the Swiss Government signed the GATT-Agreement on public procurement, 
liberalising the public markets at the federal and cantonal level. A new federal Public 
Procurement Law was adopted in order to ensure liberalisation for procurements of the central 
state. The new law states that every public procurement above a certain threshold must be 
published officially at the national and international level and attributed to the bidder 
satisfying best a number of previously defined economic criteria. The enforcement of the new 
policy is based on the possible legal review of the adjudication decision. 
Concerning the cantonal level, the GATT-agreement was mainly taken over by means of an 
intercantonal agreement. In addition, the central government included the field of public 
procurement in the project of a new Internal Market Law that was part of the revitalisation 
program and that was designed to break down any sort of protectionist barriers between 
cantons. This new law was largely inspired by EU-legislation, notably the Cassis-de-Dijon 
principle, and aimed at the creation of a common intercantonal market. As an independent 
transsectoral authority, the ComCo is competent for supervising the implementation of the 
Internal Market Law, and thus the opening up of cantonal public markets. 
3. Dynamics of reform: the interactions between international changes and 
domestic impulses 
It is possible to identify common patterns in the reform processes of our three case studies. To 
analyse them, we proceed in two steps. First, we briefly show how these policy domains have 
become increasingly internationalised during the last twenty years, which provided 
opportunities for changes at the domestic level. Second, we highlight how new international 
regulations affected domestic politics through changing power relations and the emergence of 
new actors, which were both decisive for the reforms. 
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3.1. External dynamic of change 
The three policy domains under scrutiny have all become during the last two decades 
increasingly “internationalised” through the adoption of inter- or supranational regulations 
(from the EU or the WTO). This does not mean that all competencies were transferred to 
supranational institutions, but that the international dimension of these policies should be 
taken into account for the study of national political processes. In addition, it should be 
stressed that even highly europeanised policies as the liberalisation of telecommunications or 
public procurement might also be affected by economic pressure, rather independent from EU 
regulations. For a non-EU-member state like Switzerland, the impact of economic pressure 
raised by domestic economic actors can be even more important than regulatory pressure 
stemming from EU policy. As they result either from supranational regulations or/and from 
economic liberalisation, international pressure differ in the three policy domains and its 
impact on domestic politics and policies has to be specified for each case. Without going into 
details, we shall recall the major changes that took place at the international level, and precise 
the pressure for reform emanating from the accentuation of the “policy misfit” between the 
supranational and the national level, which gave the opportunity for domestic actors to initiate 
policy reforms. 
 
With the adoption of the Single European Act in the mid-1980s, the European competition 
policy under the direction of very active commissioners became one of the most efficient 
instruments to promote competition and to liberalise European markets (see Mac Gowan and 
Wilks 1995). In parallel, all member states began to change their national competition law in 
direction of the European regulations, even though there was no formal requirement to 
proceed so (Dumez and Jeunemaître 1996). 
Despite Switzerland not being a EU-member, several Swiss companies active on European 
markets had already been sanctioned during the 1970s and 80s by the European Commission 
because of the external application of European competition rules and were thus directly 
affected by the EU competition policy. During the negotiations on the EEA Treaty, the Swiss 
negotiators tried to exclude the European competition rules or to include only one part of 
them. Finally, Switzerland had to accept that the EEA Treaty would include the complete 
European competition legislation. Even though this would not have required a reform of the 
national Cartel Law because of the direct applicability of the EU rules, the adoption by 
Switzerland of the EEA Treaty would have threatened the position of Swiss cartels on a 
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national basis3 and would have allowed the European commission to conduct its 
investigations in Switzerland (for more details see Mach 2003). After the refusal of the EEA 
Treaty, the complete reform of the Cartel Law became a central element of the governmental 
“revitalisation program”, aimed at liberalising domestic markets and promoting competition. 
Since the mid 1980s, the telecom sector has been facing profound transformations around the 
world. Driven by technological innovations, market liberalisation and ideological shifts 
among political authorities, these changes were combined with the emergence of new 
regulations at the international and national level. Sandholtz (1999) refers to the formation of 
a “supranational regime” in this field within the EU under the impulse of the European 
commission. In the member states, there was a converging trend in the reform of telecom 
sectors that took the form of liberalisation, partial privatisation and the creation of new 
independent regulatory agencies (see Eliassen and Sjovaag 1999). 
In spite of not being a EU-member, the Swiss government and most of the major economic 
and political actors clearly excluded an “Alleingang” in this field. The alignment of the 
national law on EU liberalisation and regulations was an omnipresent argument among 
political and economic actors to justify the reform. For example, the further participation of 
Swiss telecom in Unisource (an alliance between various national telecom companies), which 
represented the major instrument for its expansion abroad, was conditioned by the European 
commission to the liberalisation of the Swiss telecom market (see government report June 
1996). In addition, the Swiss government ratified in spring 1997 the GATS agreements on 
services and telecommunications. 
The source of external pressure on Switzerland in the case of public procurement reform was 
twofold: the Uruguay round GATT-agreement on public markets and EU regulations. The 
first GATT Government Procurement Agreement came into effect already in 1981. However, 
it had very little effect since its scope of application was limited to few specific suppliers. It 
was as late as April 1994, when the Uruguay-Round Agreement on Public Markets was 
signed, that constraining regulations were adopted at the GATT level. In addition, the EU 
developed since the mid-1980s a lively activity in liberalising access to public markets among 
the member states. Between 1988 and 1992, five directives were adopted. These norms apply 
on all territorial levels and on all types of public procurement above certain thresholds (Lodge 
2000). The “acquis communautaire” on this issue was also part of the EEA Treaty.  
In 1994, on the request of the Swiss government, bilateral negotiations with the EU on seven 
areas, including public markets, were engaged. These negotiations were concluded in 
November 1998. By including local authorities and even private companies with a public 
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license, the bilateral agreement on public markets is supposed to fill the remaining gaps 
between the GATT regulations and EU-Law. 
3.2. Differential empowerment and the emergence of new “norm entrepreneurs” 
We now analyse how these external changes were “internalised” at the domestic level. First, 
in a context of market liberalisation, the political and economic preferences of mobile capital 
are changing and rely less on the national economy. Thus, the power resources of these 
sectors, which can more credibly threaten an “exit option”, are strengthened, whereas labour 
and producers depending on domestic markets are weakened (Keohane and Milner 1996). 
What is true for the impact of economic globalisation presents some analogies with the 
formation of international institutions with increasing supranational dimension. Following 
Moravcisk (1994) and Börzel and Risse (2002), we argue that policy changes at the 
international level favour the redistribution of political resources at the national level. Political 
actors, whose preferences are in line with international policy evolution, can legitimate 
domestic reforms with reference to external changes. Furthermore, actors who have access to 
international arenas (such as European institutions or the WTO), are strengthened in terms of 
initiative and ideas in the domestic decision-making process, whereas others are weakened. 
The access to international institutions also favours learning processes among certain national 
actors, which can then promote domestic changes along new international regulations. 
This general analysis of the domestic impact of international transformations is also relevant 
for Switzerland, even though Swiss authorities are not directly involved in the decision-
making process at the European level. In fact, as a small open economy in the centre of 
Europe, Switzerland is unavoidably affected by the acceleration of European economic 
integration, and can therefore not completely ignore it. In all three cases under scrutiny, we 
could identify similar political processes characterised by the modification of power relations 
between political actors and by the emergence of new actors that were previously less 
important in these policy domains. 
Before addressing more specifically each reform process, we should first underline that the 
economic revitalisation program launched by the government was largely inspired by 
publications emanating from certain domestic actors. Several influential studies by 
economists (Borner and al. 1990 and Hauser and Bradke 1992), by representatives of the most 
internationalised economic sectors (Leutwiler and al. 1991 and the de Pury report of 19924), 
and by the Office of foreign economic affairs (Report on the foreign economic policy 1991) 
openly criticised the negative economic impact of the lack of competition on domestic 
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markets and suggested radical measures to improve the competitiveness of the Swiss 
economy. The government, which at that time was in favour of an adhesion to the EU, was 
very receptive to these policy proposals for three major reasons: 1) the context of economic 
recession and the disarray from isolation in Europe after the EEA refusal generated an appeal 
for economic reforms; 2) these pro-liberalisation actors had close links to the government, and 
particularly to the department of economic affairs, and 3) the opponents to the reforms 
remained underrepresented in the government5. Thus we can identify the formation of a broad 
“pro-liberalisation” coalition in line with, and inspired by, the evolution at the international 
level, composed by representatives of the most internationalised Swiss companies, by some 
well known economic experts, and by segments of the administration. This coalition shaped 
the agenda and the general orientation of the revitalisation program, in which economic 
regulatory reforms took a central place. 
 
In each case under study, we noted that the major initiators of the reforms were actors whose 
preferences were in line with regulatory reforms at the international level. Their policy 
proposals were generally made with direct reference to changes in other countries and at the 
European level. On the other hand, the opponents, despite strongly established position in 
these policy domains, adopted to a large extent a purely defensive attitude and were in an 
increasingly difficult position to present credible alternative solutions. This is true for the 
Swiss Union of Small Businesses (USAM) and the construction industry for the cartel reform 
and public procurement liberalisation as well as for the public trade unions and parts of the 
Social democratic party concerning telecom liberalisation. 
In the case of the Cartel Law, where business associations had constantly opposed in the past 
a reinforcement of the legislation, the major advocates of the reform were representatives of 
the most internationalised Swiss companies. These companies were increasingly affected by 
European competition rules and depended much less on national regulation. The sharpening 
of national competition rules became a priority for these actors at the beginning of the 1990s 
because they did not tolerate anymore the costs induced by anti-competitive practices 
favouring mostly the domestic sectors of the economy (“de Pury Report” 1992). In the 
telecom sector too, the authors of the “de Pury report” urged for a complete separation of the 
telecom and the postal sectors, for their rapid liberalisation and privatisation in order to reduce 
the costs of telecom services. In both cases, the evolution at the European level served as a 
major source of inspiration and legitimation for these actors. Even though in the case of 
public procurement legal compliance to international binding norms was more important than 
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in the other cases, the domestic power relations also played a decisive role. From the 
beginning of the 1990s onwards, representatives of the export oriented economic sectors have 
strongly advocated a liberalisation of public markets policy in order to gain access to foreign 
markets for Swiss companies. 
 
Although the existence of a pro-liberalisation coalition was very important for initiating the 
reforms, the role of the government was decisive by appointing new administrative actors or 
independent experts, who had usually not been involved (or only marginally) in these policy 
domains, to draft the initial bills of the reforms. These new “norm entrepreneurs” became 
crucial agents in the decision-making processes. Among these newly empowered actors, we 
should mention the Office for foreign economic affairs (OFEA) concerning the first telecom 
reform of 1991, the Cartel Law and the Internal Market Law, the Office for communications 
(OFCOM), created in 19926, as well as some independent economic and legal experts. For 
each case, as we shall see in more details in the next section, these actors played a central role 
in the initial steps of the reform processes. Most of these actors have direct contacts to 
international political arenas, and are therefore particularly able to transpose at the national 
level solutions adopted at the international level. On the other hand, administrative actors, 
who were traditionally very important in these policy domains, such as the cartel commission, 
the head of the PTT or the cantons, were marginalised in the policy process. 
4. How to overcome institutional rigidities? 
After having identified the main external changes affecting domestic power relations and 
learning processes, we now concentrate on the decision-making processes. Börzel and Risse 
(2002) argue that the impact of external changes leads to domestic policy reforms only under 
the condition of a “change-friendly” institutional structure of the national political system, 
which, as shown above, is by far not the case in Switzerland. However, in all three cases, 
substantive economic regulatory reforms could be achieved in a short period of time despite 
the presence of veto points. As we shall show in the following sections, two factors are 
particularly relevant for explaining this finding: 1) the crucial role played by the government 
and the administration in strategically shaping the pre-parliamentary phase (PPP), resulting 
into a marginalisation of the opponents; 2) The subsequent granting of strategic concessions 
to the losers. These concessions explain the relatively strong support for the reforms, 
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illustrated by the existence of large parliamentary majorities and by the absence of any 
optional referendum. 
4.1. Less inclusive decision-making processes 
In all three case studies, opponents were marginalised in the PPP through the amendment of 
the traditional inclusive decision-making structures. The federal administration sought and 
succeeded to keep the upper hand and to leave aside both interest groups and subnational 
units. 
While for the first reform of the Cartel Law adopted in 1986, the cartel commission, an 
administrative body in which all the major economic interest organisations are represented, 
had played the role of the experts committee, this was not the case for the reform of 1995. 
Instead, the government established a specific ad hoc committee without any representatives 
of the economic interests, chaired by the vice-director of the Office for foreign economic 
affairs, a strong advocate of the reinforcement of the competition policy. The traditional 
business associations were excluded from this ad hoc experts committee, composed only by 
competition law specialists. The USAM asked in vain for the establishment of a new 
committee including the representatives of economic associations. The cartel commission, 
which was the central administrative agency in this policy domain, was closely associated to 
the reform process, but did not play a central role in the elaboration of the draft. 
A very similar change can be observed in the case of the telecommunications sector, where no 
experts committee at all was established for the 1997 reform. The draft was elaborated by a 
small group of high civil servants of the OFCOM based on expert reports on the future of the 
telecom sector made by specialised private consulting companies. The proposal elaborated on 
this base was then adopted by the government. The trade unions of the PTT were largely 
excluded from the PPP and could only express their position during the consultation 
procedure. Similarly, the preferences of the head of the PTT, another traditionally central 
actor in the field, were finally not taken into account by the government. A majority of the 
PTT directory board favoured the creation of a Holding society, which would have kept 
together the two companies of the postal and the telecommunication sectors (Pravato 1998). 
The government, however, finally decided not to retain this solution and opted for a complete 
separation of the two companies with two different statutes, a solution privileged by the pro-
liberalisation coalition and the OFCOM. 
In the reform of public markets legislation, the main opponents were also excluded to a large 
extent from the PPP in the case of the Public Procurement Law as well as the Internal Market 
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Law. For the elaboration of the first law, no experts committee was created, although the 
construction industry and USAM had explicitly claimed at several occasions to be associated 
to the reform (Position articulated in the consultation procedure, August 1994). The new law 
was drafted by the Ministry of Finance alone and submitted to consultation for a period of 
only three months together with the whole GATT-package. Similarly, the new Internal 
Market Law was drafted by an experts committee composed by law specialists, while interest 
organisations and the representatives of the cantons remained excluded. Some members of the 
OFAE, the office in charge of the new law, were also represented in that committee7.  
 
The parallels between the three cases are striking: all of them show a clear leading role of the 
government and of some segments of the administration, coupled with the substitution of 
expertise provided by interest associations by more “independent” forms of expertise. Three 
factors can explain the unusually strong role of the government. First, the existence of 
international regulations facilitated the leadership of those parts of the administration that 
were well informed about the evolution at the international level and were thus able to play a 
central role in transposing these new regulations at the national level. Second, the high 
complexity of the three domains (juridical for all cases8 and also technical for the telecom) 
also helps to explain the strong role played by the administration and experts in the 
formulation of the reforms, while other political actors (economic interests and political 
parties) did not have the necessary expertise to promote alternative credible solutions. Finally, 
the initial reform proposals formulated by the administration or by independent experts 
benefited from the support of a broad pro-liberalisation coalition, whereas the mobilisation of 
the opponents was much more issue specific. 
Usually, encompassing expert committees, largely composed of interest representatives, trace 
consensually the general orientation of new laws in the PPP, so that it is worth noting here 
that neither interest organisations nor cantons were represented in any experts committee. 
Such an amendment of the PPP allowed the government to circumvent largely the pre-
parliamentary veto points, that increase transaction costs and usually award to organised 
interests or to coalitions of cantons the opportunity to oppose policy changes. 
The absence of an encompassing PPP and the ensuing marginalisation of the opponents might 
foster a high degree of conflictuality in the subsequent phases of policy-making. Thanks to 
cooperative decision-making in the PPP, the parliament generally does not call into question 
the governmental proposals and only marginally modifies them because they integrate the 
views of the main political and economic actors. Considering the absence of such extensive 
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compromise-seeking practices in the PPP, we would expect opponents to mobilise strongly 
against reforms in Parliament. However, the parliament remained particularly passive and did 
not modify substantially the governmental bills. 
4.2. Strategic concessions and consensual outputs 
The absence of high polarisation in parliament and of optional referendum launched against 
the reforms in all three cases can be explained by the fact that selective concessions were 
granted to the “losers” of the reform processes (trade unions, domestic economic sectors, and 
cantons). We do not argue that this was planned from the outset. We maintain however that 
the risk of reform failure caused by a less encompassing PPP was reduced by such 
concessions. And clearly such a procedure presented the advantage that the impetus for 
reforms could take place without entrenched interests being able to voice against it in the 
crucial initial steps of the policy process. 
Striking parallels can again be observed for all three cases: in a first step, the general lines of 
the reforms were drafted by a small group of high civil servants and independent experts; in a 
second step, but still mainly in the PPP after the consultation procedure, some strategic 
concessions to the opponents were introduced into the draft. Thus we notice that even the 
uncommonly exclusive PPP led to rather consensual outputs. 
 
In the Cartel Law reform, the initial draft bill of the experts committee proposed to exclude 
representatives of economic interest organisations from the new ComCo and to appoint only 
independent experts. This solution was abandoned because of the opposition by the economic 
associations, very attached to their representation in the commission. Nevertheless, it is 
clearly stipulated in the new law that independent experts should represent a majority in the 
commission. Initially, the government also wanted to introduce an interdiction principle on 
cartels as in the EU, and had to refrain from that. Although this renouncement looks at first 
sight like a concession to the opponents, it was rather the result of institutional constraints: the 
change from an “abuse principle regime” to an “interdiction regime” would have required an 
amendment of the Constitution and a compulsory popular referendum, which would have 
taken many more years. This option was finally not retained because of the too lengthy 
decision-making process and the possibility to sharpen the law without a constitutional 
reform. The reform of the Cartel Law, however, still faced strong opposition from the small 
business association (USAM) and parts of the USCI, the Swiss federation of commerce and 
industry. The political representatives of these economic sectors tried to further edulcorate the 
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reform in parliament, but were clearly outvoted. In a first step, the USAM announced that 
they would fight the reform by launching an optional referendum, but finally renounced 
because they were not able to find any significant allies. 
The telecom reform was part of a package deal that included a complete transformation of the 
former PTT. Those who objected to the reform (the trade unions mainly) or those who were 
sceptical (a large part of the social-democratic party) about the liberalisation of the telecom 
and postal services were partially satisfied by the less pronounced liberalisation of the postal 
services and, therefore, did not oppose the general reform. In fact, the monopoly of the Post 
on packets was maintained at the level of 2 kg, whereas the liberalisation in the EU was 
already settled for packets at 0.35 kg, and no independent regulatory agency was created for 
the postal sector. The left was very attentive to preserve the situation of the Post, directed by a 
social-democratic manager, against a too wide-ranging liberalisation, whereas the rapid 
liberalisation of the telecom market was a priority for economic interests and the political 
right. Thus, the inclusion of the telecom reform in a more global package deal on the 
transformation of the PTT facilitated its consensual adoption9. 
The importance of competitive veto points appears even more clearly in the case of 
liberalisation of public markets at the cantonal level, i.e. the adoption of the Internal Market 
Law, where the federalist structure of Switzerland played a major role. The national 
government was not thoroughly successful in excluding the cantons from the PPP. Instead, 
realising that the Internal Market Law would surely not be accepted in its initial form in the 
second federalist Chamber of Parliament, it had to associate the cantons in unplanned and 
uncommon negotiations that took place after the consultation procedure. In these negotiations, 
the compulsory character of the national regulation was reduced in order to safeguard to some 
extent the cantonal autonomy (see Cottier and Wagner 1995). Some further minor limitations 
of its scope occurred again in Parliament. Priority of (inter-)cantonal law was maintained and 
the competencies of the ComCo for supervising the implementation of the law were restricted. 
 
Selective concessions in favour of the “losers” of the reforms allowed the government to 
overcome rapidly and rather easily the competitive veto points of bicameralism and the 
optional referendum. As an additional factor explaining the passive role of the parliament, one 
has to take into consideration the time pressure under which the reforms were approved. In 
two cases, the parliamentary debates took place under the pressure of coping with the 
international agenda (telecom liberalisation in the EU and the ratification of the GATT-
agreement). But even the cases of Cartel Law reform and the adoption of the new Internal 
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Market Law – as parts of the governmental revitalisation program – were considered as 
urgent, given the proclaimed necessity to improve rapidly the competitiveness of the Swiss 
economy10. 
The three reform processes can be recapitulated in the following table: 
 
Table 1 Economic regulatory reforms under external pressure: a synthetic overview 
 Competition policy Telecom liberalisation Public markets 
External pressures 
- Economic 
- Legal 
 
Competitiveness 
- 
 
Competitiveness 
GATS Agreement 
 
 
GATT Agreement 
New norm 
entrepreneurs 
OFEA, economic and 
legal experts 
OFEA and OFCOM OFEA, legal experts 
Losers USAM, domestic 
producers 
trade unions of the 
public sector 
USAM, construction 
industry, cantons  
Decision-making 
process 
Marginalisation of 
opponents in PPP 
Marginalisation of 
opponents in PPP 
Marginalisation of 
opponents in PPP 
Strategic concessions No exclusion of 
economic interests 
from the ComCo 
Package deal with 
postal reform 
Partial preservation of 
cantonal autonomy 
Newly empowered 
regulatory authorities 
ComCo OFCOM 
ComCom 
ComCo 
ComCo, courts, 
Federal recourse 
commission 
List of abbreviations: 
ComCo: Competition Commission 
ComCom: Communication Commission 
OFCOM: Federal Office for Communications 
OFEA: Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs 
USAM: Swiss Union of Small Businesses 
Conclusion 
For the three economic regulatory reforms, we were able to identify some decision-making 
patterns, that strongly deviate from the standard Swiss policy making process. First, we noted 
an unusually active role of governmental agencies which were able to use the “external lever” 
in order to affirm their preferences for reform and to overcome internal opposition. Second, 
cooperative and inclusive decision-making procedures lost part of their significance through 
the marginalisation of opponents during the PPP (exclusion or only selective association of 
opponents in experts committees). On the other hand, given the veto points of direct 
democracy and federalist structure, strategic concessions were made to the losers of the 
reforms, which allowed to overcome their opposition and to achieve wide support for policy 
change. 
 18 
The existence of institutional rigidities and veto points in Switzerland is largely used as an 
explanatory variable for an allegedly low governmental capacity for action. In a changing 
international environment however, the government and more specifically some parts of its 
administration that were willing to overcome domestic resistance to reforms, were able to 
acquire a leadership by redesigning parts of the policy process. By selectively including and 
excluding actors, they succeeded in modifying the power balance among them during the 
PPP. This represented a partial shift from the usual pattern of conflict resolution, where most 
conflicts are settled as soon as possible at the risk of preventing ambitious reforms, towards 
less inclusive decision-making likely to increase the risk of policy blockade. The new recipe 
consisted in initiating reforms in a top-down manner, and in partially watering them down 
only subsequently so as to ensure their acceptance. While collective veto points in the PPP 
were circumvented by the marginalisation of the opponents, the competitive veto points were 
mainly overcome by means of strategic and selective concessions to the “losers” of the 
reforms. We need to add however that such a governmental leadership would not have been 
possible without the support by a “pro-liberalisation” coalition powerfully represented within 
key economic sectors, nor without the availability of top public executives and independent 
experts who acted as norm entrepreneurs. On a more theoretical level, our case studies also 
show that domestic institutional structures should not only be seen as a “rigid filter” for 
externally induced policy changes, but they may themselves be strategically reshaped by 
national actors willing to adjust. 
Ultimately, one of the most striking results of the three case studies is the rapid adjustment of 
Swiss legislation to changes in the international environment. More than fifteen years ago, 
Katzenstein (1985) stressed the faculty of small European states to combine political stability 
with economic flexibility. Switzerland still displays a strong capacity to adjust consensually to 
international pressures, even though the neo-corporatist model that was responsible for such a 
performance tends to be superseded – as indicated in the cases of economic regulatory 
reforms – by a stronger governmental leadership which is related to the increasing role of 
international regulations in these sectors. 
Such a form of piecemeal, discrete and from issue to issue Europeanisation also stands in 
sharp contrast to immobility with respect to EU membership. Even though Switzerland is not 
a member of the EU and a majority of the Swiss people shows little interest in taking such as 
step, the adjustments that we observed in a set of major reforms of the 1990s clearly indicate a 
form of - at least partial – European integration. 
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1 Our findings are based on a detailed reconstruction of the policy-making process for each case, grounded on the 
study of documentary material (governmental reports, parliamentary debates, minutes of parliamentary 
committees, expert reports, publications of political parties and interest associations etc.) and in depth interviews 
(7 to 10 per case) with major actors involved in each policy domain. In this article, we do not analyse the 
implementation of these new policies. 
2 For example, cartel policy (where the cartel commission was composed by representatives of the major 
economic organisations), agriculture (where implementation is largely delegated to interest associations), 
banking regulation, foreign workforce policy, setting of technical standards, etc. The early and high degree of 
organisation of economic interests and the weakness of the central state explain the key role of economic 
associations in policy-making and as self-regulators of economic activities (for more details, Mach 2003). 
3 The European commission already sanctioned purely national cartels, because they were deemed to “affect 
trade between members states” as it is stipulated in the Rome Treaty.  
4 An “informal group” of representatives of the largest Swiss multinationals, in collaboration with several 
economists, published a first “white book” in 1991 (Leutwiler and al. 1991). These authors clearly stressed that 
they did not feel anymore sufficiently represented by the traditional business associations. In a second step, the 
Department of economic affairs appointed an informal experts committee, composed only by CEOs of large 
Swiss companies and by two economists, to trace the future orientation of Swiss economic policies (“de Pury 
report” 1992). 
5 Ministers of right-wing parties were not sensible to protectionist claims expressed in their parties, and ministers 
from the social-democratic party that disagreed with some aspects of liberalisation are in a minority position. 
6 The creation of the OFCOM, as a result of the first telecom reform, is particularly interesting. It was during the 
hearings of the parliamentary committee, that economic experts and the OFEA, in a completely unusual position, 
criticised the governmental proposal because no separation of regulatory function and services provision was 
planned, as it is suggested in the 1987 Green paper of the European commission on the common market for 
telecommunications. Then, the parliament, following the recommendations of the experts and the OFEA, 
decided to modify the governmental proposal and to support the creation of this new office independent from the 
PTT (Minutes of the parliamentary committee). 
7 It is interesting to note that its president, a specialist of international law, was a former employee of the OFEA 
and had participated in the GATT-negotiations himself. 
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8 In the three cases, the constitutionality of the reforms was questioned by the opponents, but as there is no 
control of constitutionality by the Supreme Court (Tribunal fédéral), this potential veto point did not represent a 
threat for the reforms. 
9 An optional referendum was launched against the whole reform package by some representatives of the left 
parties (extreme left and some sections of the social-democratic party) and by some regional sections of the trade 
unions. However, they failed to collect the 50'000 signatures necessary to organise a popular vote. 
10 It should also be mentioned that the three reforms were deliberately formulated in general terms leaving 
legislation on important regulative measures to governmental and administrative decrees and reducing thereby 
the possibility of parliamentary control. 
